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673 
HOW ‘REASONABLE’ HAS BECOME 
UNREASONABLE: A PROPOSAL FOR 
REWRITING THE LASTING LEGACY  
OF JACKSON V. INDIANA 
INTRODUCTION 
Inquiry into a defendant’s competence to stand trial has been termed 
“the most significant mental health inquiry pursued in the system of 
criminal law.”1 As a result, competency to stand trial is one of the most 
widely debated concepts in criminal jurisprudence.
2
 Proposals for 
upheaval and revision of the doctrine of competence to stand trial pervade 
legal literature.
3
 Among the most frequent contention is that competency is 
misunderstood within the legal process, leading many scholars to advocate 
for a greater understanding of the basic doctrine.
4
 One commentator even 
believes the doctrine may be doing more harm than good, and has thus 
suggested a defendant should be granted limited rights to waive 
competency inquiries.
5
  
 
 
 1. ALAN A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 200 (1975). 
 2. See generally Grant H. Morris et al., Competency to Stand Trial on Trial, 4 HOUS. J. HEALTH 
L. & POL’Y 193 (2004); Sara Longtain, Comment, The Twilight of Competency and Mental Illness: A 
Conciliatory Conception of Competency and Insanity, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1563, 1564 (2007). 
Scholarship addresses competency issues spanning juvenile proceedings to appellate litigation. See 
generally Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., Juveniles’ Competency to Stand Trial: Wading Through the Rhetoric 
and the Evidence, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 135 (2009); Mae C. Quinn, Reconceptualizing 
Competence: An Appeal, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 259 (2009). 
 3. See, e.g., Kathleen Winchell, The Need to Close Kentucky’s Revolving Door: Proposal for a 
Movement Towards a Socially Responsible Approach to Treatment and Commitment of the Mentally 
Ill, 29 N. KY. L. REV. 189 (2002); Bruce J. Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 
UCLA L. REV. 921 (1985).  
 4. See, e.g., Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusky and 
Drope, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 539, 549–60 (1993); James J. Gobert, Competency to Stand Trial: A Pre- 
and Post-Jackson Analysis, 40 TENN. L. REV. 659, 664 (1973) (“One of the chief difficulties in the 
generally prevalent formulation is its failure to recognize that defendant’s ability to communicate with 
counsel and rationally understand the proceedings might be totally irrelevant to the merits of his 
case.”); Ronald Roesch, Stephen D. Hart & Patricia A. Zapf, Conceptualizing and Assessing 
Competency to Stand Trial: Implications and Applications of the MacArthur Treatment Competence 
Model, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 96, 101–02 (1996) (arguing that competency fits best in context 
rather than being understood as one unilateral concept); see generally Louis B. Schlesinger, A Case 
Study Involving Competency to Stand Trial: Incompetent Defendant, Incompetent Examiner, or 
“Malingering by Proxy”?, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 381 (2003). 
 5. See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, Reforming Incompetency to Stand Trial and Plead Guilty: A 
Restated Proposal and a Response to Professor Bonnie, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 571, 623–24 
(1995). 
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This debate has spilled into pretrial commitment of incompetent 
defendants.
6
 Once a defendant is deemed incompetent to stand trial, courts 
typically remand the defendant to the care of state hospitals and/or mental 
health professionals.
7
 This process has spawned tales of defendants faced 
with extended pretrial commitment for alleged crimes, prompting 
revisionary proposals to protect defendants from court-sanctioned 
injustice.
8
 The debate is particularly contentious, however, because within 
this pretrial commitment process stands a trifecta of competing interests. 
While the state and public as a whole deserve protection and justice, a 
defendant equally deserves due process and a fair trial.
9
 Thus, a collision 
course is charted, with a defendant’s constitutional rights squaring off 
against the deep-rooted motivations of criminal jurisprudence—offering 
victims closure and justice while ensuring respect for the law.
10
 
This Note enters the debate over pretrial commitment for defendants 
deemed incompetent to stand trial, arguing that revisions are needed to 
remedy an insufficient patchwork of state statutory provisions providing 
for such commitment. Part I features an overview of the competency 
doctrine. Part II addresses the durational limitations on pretrial 
 
 
 6. See generally J. Amy Dillard, Without Limitation: “Groundhog Day” for Incompetent 
Defendants, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 1221 (2007); Michael L. Perlin, “For the Misdemeanor Outlaw”: 
The Impact of the ADA on the Institutionalization of Criminal Defendants With Mental Disabilities, 52 
ALA. L. REV. 193 (2000).  
 7. See Winick, supra note 5, at 571 n.1. This procedure is followed across the nation, with 
deviations typically only arising in the type of commitment—such as inpatient or outpatient. For an 
example of this procedure in Washington, see Michael J. Finkle, Washington’s Criminal Competency 
Laws: Getting From Where We Are to Where We Should Be, 5 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 201, 203–04 
(2006). 
 8. See Caleb Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108 U. PA. 
L. REV. 832 (1960) (discussing story of four military prisoners in California); Jamie Mickelson, Note, 
“Unspeakable Justice”: The Oswaldo Martinez Case and the Failure of the Legal System to 
Adequately Provide for Incompetent Defendants, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075, 2075–85 (2007) 
(detailing stories of Oswaldo Martinez and Donald Lang). 
 9. See Dillard, supra note 6, at 1225 (describing the conundrum facing both defendant and 
prosecutor in the case of Gregory Murphy); Winchell, supra note 3, at 190–92 (describing story of 
Patricia Smith); see also State v. Davis, 898 N.E.2d 281, 289 (Ind. 2008) (citing Strunk v. United 
States, 412 U.S. 434, 439 n.2 (1973); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975)) (“Justification for 
the commitment of an incompetent accused is found in the State’s interest in the restoration of the 
accused to competency because of the right of the public and the defendant to the prompt disposition 
of criminal charges pending against him . . . and the protection of the accused against being required to 
answer to charges that she lacks the capacity to understand or to assist her attorney in defending 
against.”). 
 10. See Gobert, supra note 4, at 685 (describing how pretrial commitment may serve core 
sentencing rationales, but punishment based upon such rationales is “inappropriate prior to an 
adjudication of guilt”). For a current example of this clash of interests, see Sam Penrod, Judge Orders 
Legally Incompetent Sex Offender Released, DESERET NEWS (Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.deseretnews 
.com/article/705370164/Judge-orders-legally-incompetent-sex-offender-released.html. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss3/5
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commitment of defendants deemed incompetent to stand trial set forth in 
the 1972 Supreme Court decision Jackson v. Indiana.
11
 Part III 
investigates statutory provisions in all fifty states and the District of 
Columbia to determine how states have responded to Jackson’s durational 
limitations. Finding wild variations among these state provisions, Part IV 
turns to social science literature to decipher what such durational limits 
should be. Finding a need for revision within states and for further 
research to propel these revisions, Part V proposes establishment of a 
cross-disciplinary group of experts tasked with conducting targeted 
research and crafting a model statute in hopes of providing states with a 
legislative solution to meeting Jackson’s mandate. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF COMPETENCY 
Arising from common-law roots
12
 and fears associated with a trial in 
absentia,
13
 competency to stand trial has become a fundamental concept in 
today’s criminal justice system.14 This stature is justified by an interest in 
preserving the respected appearance of the trial process, as well as 
ensuring that a fair, accurate, and adversarial trial is achieved and that 
appropriate sentencing rationales can be applied.
15
  
The Supreme Court first offered a definition of competency in Dusky v. 
United States.
16
 In a per curiam opinion, the Dusky Court stated that 
competency hinged on “whether [the defendant] has sufficient present 
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual 
understanding of the proceedings against him.”17 This standard has since 
been recognized as the baseline inquiry that due process requires.
18
 
 
 
 11. 406 U.S. 715 (1972). 
 12. See, e.g., Dillard, supra note 6, at 1225 (“The notion that a criminal defendant must be 
competent before standing trial dates as far back as medieval English law.”); Morris et al., supra note 
2, at 201 (drawing upon reports of medieval English law cases). 
 13. See Foote, supra note 8, at 834 (noting that “the mentally incompetent defendant, though 
physically present in the courtroom, is in reality afforded no opportunity to defend himself”); 
Schlesinger, supra note 4, at 381 (“The law on competency to stand trial . . . stems from the 
prohibition against trial in absentia.”). 
 14. See Longtain, supra note 2, at 1569 (“The requirement of competency ensures the accuracy, 
reliability, and integrity of criminal trials, all of which are important to both the criminal defendant and 
society as a whole.”); Perlin, supra note 6, at 198 (“Few principles are as firmly embedded in Anglo-
American criminal jurisprudence as the doctrine that an incompetent defendant may not be put to 
trial.”). 
 15. See Morris et al., supra note 2, at 201–02.  
 16. 362 U.S. 402 (1960). 
 17. Id.  
 18. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402 (1993) (noting that “while States are free to adopt 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Though initially only applicable at the federal level, the Dusky standard 
has become widely regarded as the standard state courts should apply.
19
  
A defendant’s right to competency during trial was subsequently 
ensconced in constitutional protection in Pate v. Robinson.
20
 In Pate, the 
defendant, Robinson, was convicted of murder, but not before his attorney 
raised a question as to his competence.
21
 Robinson’s attorney entered into 
evidence a long history of mental health issues by producing a slew of 
witnesses that testified to Robinson’s incompetence.22 Robinson’s 
conviction was nonetheless affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court, which 
held that Robinson had waived his right to claim incompetence, and, even 
if he had not, Robinson had failed to proffer enough evidence of his 
incompetence.
23
 The United States Supreme Court overturned Robinson’s 
conviction, finding that the Constitution requires a trial halt and an inquiry 
into competence commence when a defendant’s competency is 
questioned.
24
 The Court held that failure to perform this inquiry abridged 
Robinson’s right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
thus Robinson’s trial was fatally flawed.25 
The fundamental precepts of Dusky and Pate were then woven together 
by the Supreme Court in Drope v. Missouri.
26
 In Drope, the petitioner was 
on trial for the forcible rape of his wife.
27
 The petitioner’s counsel filed a 
pretrial request for an inquiry into the petitioner’s competence 
 
 
competency standards that are more elaborate than the Dusky formulation, the Due Process Clause 
does not impose these additional requirements”). 
 19. See Morris et al., supra note 2, at 208 (“[S]tate courts in interpreting their states’ competency 
statutes have quoted the Dusky language verbatim, accepting the Dusky standard as the required 
standard for measuring competency. These decisions have occurred with such frequency that some 
commentators have asserted that all states construe their statutes to conform with the Dusky 
standard.”); Benjamin James Vernia, Note, The Burden of Proving Competence to Stand Trial: Due 
Process at the Limits of Adversarial Justice, 45 VAND. L. REV. 199, 203 (1992) (“Although the 
Supreme Court has never held expressly that states must apply the standard it announced in Dusky, 
states have followed the same formulation.”); see also, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3301(1) (2007); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5.3-3(a)(2) (2006) (“‘Competent’ or ‘competency’ means mental ability to 
stand trial. A person is mentally competent to stand trial if he or she is able to understand the character 
and consequences of the proceedings against him or her and is able properly to assist in his or her 
defense.”); Adams v. State, 509 N.E.2d 812, 814 (Ind. 1987) (“The test for competency is whether the 
defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with defense counsel with a reasonable degree of 
rational understanding, and whether the defendant has a rational as well as a factual understanding of 
the proceedings against him.”). 
 20. 383 U.S. 375 (1966). 
 21. Id. at 376. 
 22. Id. at 378. 
 23. Id. at 376–77. 
 24. Id. at 385–87. 
 25. Id. at 386–87. 
 26. 420 U.S. 162 (1975). 
 27. Id. at 164. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss3/5
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accompanied by a psychiatric report declaring him to be in need of 
psychiatric assistance.
28
 The petitioner’s wife then testified that her 
husband suffered from irrational behavior, which was followed by the 
petitioner attempted suicide during trial.
29
 In analyzing his subsequent 
conviction, the Supreme Court stated that to meet the Dusky standard, “[i]t 
has long been accepted that a person whose mental condition is such that 
he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the 
proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing 
his defense may not be subjected to a trial.”30 Under this standard, the 
Court vacated the petitioner’s conviction, stating, “[w]hatever the 
relationship between mental illness and incompetence to stand trial, in this 
case the bearing of the former on the latter was sufficiently likely that . . . 
the correct course was to suspend the trial until such an evaluation could 
be made.”31  
As a result, when faced with a defendant whose competence is 
questioned, courts follow the approach set out in Dusky and Drope to 
evaluate a defendant’s fitness to proceed.32 
II. JACKSON V. INDIANA 
A. The Case 
The Supreme Court added another wrinkle to the competency doctrine 
when it decided Jackson v. Indiana in 1972.
33
 The defendant in Jackson 
was a “mentally defective deaf mute with a mental level of a pre-school 
child,” rendering his ability to communicate virtually nonexistent.34 
Arrested on suspicion of two separate robberies, Jackson was deemed 
incompetent to stand trial and committed to the Indiana Department of 
 
 
 28. Id. at 164 n.1. 
 29. Id. at 165–67. 
 30. Id. at 171. 
 31. Id. at 181. 
 32. See Bonnie, supra note 4, at 548 (noting that “the criteria articulated in Dusky v. United 
States and Drope v. Missouri . . . typically are said to denote ‘competence to stand trial’”). 
 33. 406 U.S. 715 (1972). 
 34. Id. at 717. While outside the scope of this Note, it is worthwhile to mention that in the wake 
of Jackson a new subcategory of “incompetent” defendants has arisen—individuals considered 
“linguistically incompetent defendants.” See Mickelson, supra note 8, at 2113–14. This subcategory 
includes defendants who do not suffer from a mental disorder but instead lack the ability to 
communicate. They are thus “incompetent to stand trial” based solely on their inability to 
communicate with their attorneys, but do not qualify for civil commitment proceedings in many states. 
Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Mental Health until “the defendant [was] sane.”35 Armed with physician 
evaluations finding Jackson’s prognosis “rather dim”36 and doubting his 
ability to ever attain the communication skills necessary to be deemed 
competent, Jackson’s counsel filed a petition alleging—in part—that 
Jackson’s commitment amounted to a “life sentence” in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.37 The Court agreed, finding 
that “Indiana’s indefinite commitment of a criminal defendant solely on 
account of his incompetency to stand trial does not square with the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process.”38 The Court then 
stated that “[a]t the least, due process requires that the nature and duration 
of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the 
individual is committed.”39 To flesh out this “rule of reasonableness,”40 the 
Court continued: 
 
 
 35. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 717–19. The Indiana statute at the time, IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1706(a) 
(Supp. 1971), allowed for commitment after two “competent disinterested physicians” had time to 
examine the defendant and testify to his sanity, as well as a court subsequently finding the defendant 
incompetent to stand trial. Id. at 717 n.1. Additionally, the statute mandated that a defendant be held in 
custody until restored to sanity. Id. 
 In Jackson’s case, his evaluating physicians concluded that his “almost non-existent 
communication skill, together with his lack of hearing and his mental deficiency, left him unable to 
understand the nature of the charges against him or to participate in his defense.” Id. at 718. The 
weight of this evidence led the Court to conclude, “[t]here is nothing in the record that even points to 
any possibility that Jackson’s present condition can be remedied at any future time.” Id. at 726. 
 36. Id. at 719. 
 37. Id. Jackson’s counsel also argued that Jackson’s commitment violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, in that the state court had treated his commitment differently 
than those involuntarily committed under Indiana’s civil commitment statutes at the time—which 
invoked different standards for commitment and release. Id. at 723. This argument was successful. Id. 
at 729–30. In so holding, the Court stated: 
Consequently, we hold that by subjecting Jackson to a more lenient commitment standard and 
to a more stringent standard of release than those generally applicable to all others not 
charged with offenses, and by thus condemning him in effect to permanent institutionalization 
without the showing required for commitment or the opportunity for release afforded by [the 
civil commitment statutes], Indiana deprived petitioner of equal protection of the laws under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Id. at 730. However, this holding may have been unnecessary, given the Court’s due process 
determination. See Gobert, supra note 4, at 681–82.  
 38. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 731. 
 39. Id. at 738. 
 40. Id. at 733. The federal standard, under 18 U.S.C. §§ 4244–48 (1970), permitted “indefinite 
commitment” only if a defendant was deemed incompetent to stand trial, dangerous, and that “suitable 
arrangements for the custody and care of the prisoner [were] not otherwise available.” Id. at 731–33; 
see also Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 373–74 (1956). Armed with this blend of criminal 
and civil commitment standards, the Court was satisfied that commitment was not based on 
incompetency alone—which it readily asserted would not accord with the Due Process Clause when a 
defendant of questionable ability to attain competency was at issue and the commitment was for an 
indeterminate period of time. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738; see also Gobert, supra note 4, at 683 (stating 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss3/5
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We hold, consequently, that a person charged by a State with a 
criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his 
incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the 
reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a 
substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the 
foreseeable future. If it is determined that this is not the case, then 
the State must either institute the customary civil commitment 
proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely any other 
citizen, or release the defendant. Furthermore, even if it is 
determined that the defendant probably soon will be able to stand 
trial, his continued commitment must be justified by progress 
toward that goal. In light of differing state facilities and procedures 
and a lack of evidence in this record, we do not think it appropriate 
for us to attempt to prescribe arbitrary time limits. We note, 
however, that petitioner Jackson has now been confined for three 
and one-half years on a record that sufficiently establishes the lack 
of a substantial probability that he will ever be able to participate 
fully in a trial.
41
 
The Court then remanded the case to the Indiana courts to consider 
Jackson’s commitment under its newly established standard, with the hint 
that Jackson’s situation fell into the first category of defendants—those 
without the capacity to attain competency in the “foreseeable future.”42 
B. The Mandate 
Jackson thus held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause mandates state-imposed durational limits on two separate inquiries 
surrounding competence to stand trial. First, if a defendant faces pretrial 
commitment solely based upon a finding of incompetence to stand trial, 
then the defendant must undergo evaluation within a “reasonable” time to 
determine if he or she will attain competency in the “foreseeable future.”43 
If this evaluation finds that a defendant will not attain competency within 
the “foreseeable future,” Jackson mandates either dismissal of the charges 
 
 
that “the Supreme Court decided that the rule of reasonableness, which had previously been applied to 
federal incompetency statutes, was in fact a constitutional requisite binding on state incompetency 
procedures as well”). 
 41. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738–39. 
 42. See id. at 741. 
 43. Id. at 738. This has become Jackson’s lasting mantra. See Perlin, supra note 6, at 204. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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or initiation of civil commitment proceedings.
44
 Second, if this initial 
inquiry reveals that a defendant will “probably soon” attain competency, 
commitment may continue—but it must end once it is no longer “justified 
by progress toward that goal.”45 However, the Court coyly declined to 
offer specific “arbitrary”46 time limits for these two durational limitations, 
and thus left unresolved what these time limits should be.
47
 Therefore, two 
durational questions linger in the wake of Jackson: 
(1) What constitutes, for the purposes of due process, a “reasonable 
period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial 
probability that [the defendant] will attain [competency] in the 
foreseeable future?”48 
(2) Further, given Jackson’s spirit of limiting indefinite 
commitment of incompetent defendants, when is continued 
commitment no longer “justified by progress toward”49 the goal of 
restoring competency for the purposes of due process? 
 
 
 44. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738. 
 45. Id. This second limitation has also been interpreted to require periodic review of a 
defendant’s competency status if commitment continues. See Grant H. Morris & J. Reid Meloy, Out of 
Mind? Out of Sight: The Uncivil Commitment of Permanently Incompetent Criminal Defendants, 27 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 10–12 (1993) (“Although the language of Jackson does not impose a duty of 
judicial oversight, such a duty is implicit. By its decision to commit a defendant for treatment to 
restore competence, the committing court becomes responsible for monitoring the progress of that 
treatment which serves as the sole legal justification for continued confinement.”). Because this Note 
is primarily focused on durational limitations for commitment, periodic review provisions are not 
discussed in depth. However, it is important to note that periodic review, coupled with the two 
durational inquiries, helps form what has been commonly termed as the three requirements of Jackson. 
This three-part mandate was addressed by Morris and Meloy, wherein both scholars surveyed all fifty 
states’ and the District of Columbia’s provisions relating to this three-part mandate. Id. at 9–22. They 
then focused on the problems inherent in California’s “conservatorship” statute while urging 
compliance with Jackson. Additionally, Ronald Roesch and Stephen Golding also briefly discussed 
this three-part framework, but proceeded to recommend a trial on the merits of a defendant’s case be 
held in order to allow continued commitment. RONALD ROESCH & STEPHEN L. GOLDING, 
COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 120–31, 209–16 (1980). While approving of and investigating 
durational limits within this three-part framework, this Note diverges by attempting to provide answers 
to Jackson’s lingering questions rather than propose alternative solutions. 
 The Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a “speedy trial” also enters the picture at this point, but its 
provisions and possible infringements are also outside the scope of this Note. For a brief overview, see 
Dillard, supra note 6, at 1231 n.72 (citing and explaining the import of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 
(1972)). 
 46. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738. 
 47. See Robert A. Nicholson & Karen E. Kugler, Competent and Incompetent Criminal 
Defendants: A Quantitative Review of Comparative Research, 109 PSYCHOL. BULL. 355, 355 (1991) 
(stating that “the court did not set firm limits on the duration of commitment”). 
 48. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738. 
 49. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss3/5
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The following part discusses the divergent paths states have taken in an 
attempt to answer these lingering durational questions. 
III. STATE RESPONSES TO JACKSON 
Based upon a fifty-state study,
50
 forty-four states have attempted to 
define a “reasonable” time for commitment to predict restorability,51 and 
forty states have attempted to place an upper limit on commitment for 
restoration of competence.
52
 Of note, four states have chosen to avoid 
Jackson’s mandate altogether by allowing for only civil commitments.53 
The following parts expound upon these state responses. 
A. State Responses to Jackson’s Directive That Commitment be Limited to 
the “Reasonable Period of Time Necessary”54 to Predict Restorability 
Jackson first required that a defendant deemed incompetent to stand 
trial not be committed for “more than the reasonable period of time 
necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he 
will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future.”55 At the outset, this 
mandate presupposes a court has already determined a defendant is 
incompetent to stand trial. States have responded to this directive in three 
ways: (1) by avoiding Jackson entirely and instead assessing a defendant’s 
restorability at the initial competency determination; (2) by placing a 
specific limit on the duration of this commitment; and (3) by rehashing 
 
 
 50. For the purpose of simplicity, the District of Columbia is referred to as a state throughout 
Part III. 
 51. These states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, 
and Wyoming.  
 52. These states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.  
 53. These states are: Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Vermont. See MINN. R. 
CRIM. PROC. 20.01, subdiv. 6(b)(1) (West 2010) (“If the defendant is not under commitment, the court 
must commence a civil commitment proceeding.”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135:17-a(II) (2005) 
(permitting commitment pursuant to civil proceedings); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1002(b)(1), 15A-
1004(b) (2007) (allowing for commitment pursuant to civil proceedings); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, 
§§ 4820(2)–(4) (2009) (providing for only civil commitment upon a finding of incompetence). 
 54. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). 
 55. Id. 
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Jackson’s language without providing any guidance. Overall, just one state 
has failed to incorporate any approach within its statutory fabric.
56
 
1. States Avoiding Jackson and Requiring Evaluation of Restorability 
at the Initial Competency Determination 
Fourteen states require the determination of a defendant’s ability to 
attain competency in the foreseeable future at an initial proceeding in 
place to evaluate a defendant’s general competence to proceed.57 Given 
Jackson’s language, these states avoid the thorny issue of post-
determination commitment entirely. One such state is Alabama, which 
specifies that if “reasonable ground[s] exist to doubt the defendant’s 
mental competency” based upon expert reports, a judge shall set a hearing 
within forty-two days.
58
 At this hearing, if the judge or jury determines 
that the defendant is not competent to proceed, a further finding of 
whether there is “a substantial probability that the defendant will be 
restored to competency within a reasonable period of time” is required.59  
Nearly all states within this category also limit the time a defendant can 
be committed for the purposes of evaluating his or her competency and 
 
 
 56. This state is Delaware. For the purposes of drawing a line between states that have and have 
not responded to Jackson’s first durational inquiry, this part considers the four states allowing for only 
civil commitment as having responded—though, by skirting Jackson entirely, they may more properly 
belong in the first category of states in this part.  
 57. These states are: Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See 
ALA. R. CRIM. PROC. 11.6(c)(3) (LexisNexis 2009) (rehashing Jackson’s language without specifying 
period of time, but directing inquiry to be completed at initial competency inquiry); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-4507(F) (2010 & Supp. 2011) (providing for a maximum of forty-five days of commitment 
prior to initial competency hearing); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4510(C) (2010 & Supp. 2011) 
(providing for prediction of future competence at initial competency hearing); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 54-56d(d)–(e) (West 2009 & Supp. 2011) (allowing for determination at initial competency 
hearing, but also allowing thirty-one days for commitment of defendants for this evaluation); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 916.12(4)(d) (West 2001 & Supp. 2011); FLA. R. CRIM. PROC. 3.212(c)(3)(B) (West 
2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.110(1) (LexisNexis 2008) (providing for determination of future 
competence at initial competency hearing); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.080 (LexisNexis 2008) 
(providing that the court can commit a defendant for thirty days to evaluate potential incompetency); 
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 648(A) (2003 & Supp. 2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 330.2028(2)(d) (West 1999) (requiring that determination must be made within sixty days); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 12.1-04-08(1) (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.38(B) (LexisNexis 2010); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1175.5(2) (West 2003 & Supp. 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5.3-3(f) (2006 & 
Supp. 2010) (report must be filed within ten days); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-23-410(A)(1), 44-23-
420(A) (2002 & Supp. 2010) (providing that defendant can be detained for thirty days, and that a 
report of findings must be filed within ten days following detention); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-6A-3(e) 
(LexisNexis 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.14(3)(d) (West 2007 & Supp. 2010). 
 58. ALA. R. CRIM. PROC. 11.6(a) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 59. Id. at 11.6(c)(3). 
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predicting restorability, ranging from a low of ten days
60
 to a high of sixty 
days.
61
 States that specify permissible duration of this commitment, 
however, generally allow between thirty and sixty days of commitment to 
complete this evaluation.
62
 
2. States Placing a Specific Durational Limit on Commitment for 
Prediction of a Defendant’s Restorability  
Thirty states expressly limit the time a defendant deemed incompetent 
to proceed can be committed for inquiry into his or her ability to attain 
competency in the foreseeable future.
63
 These time limits vary widely, 
 
 
 60. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5.3-3(f) (2006 & Supp. 2010) (requiring that report must be filed 
within ten days). 
 61. See MINN. R. CRIM. PROC. 20.01, subdiv. 4(a) (West 2010) (allowing sixty days to complete 
examination). 
 62. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4507(F) (2010) (providing for commitment of at most 
forty-five days prior to initial competency hearing); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.080 (LexisNexis 
2008) (providing that court can commit defendant for thirty days to evaluate potential to regain 
competency); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-23-410(A)(1), 44-23-420 (2002 & Supp. 2010) (providing that 
defendant can be detained for thirty days, and that report of findings must be filed within ten days 
following detention). 
 63. These states are: Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Georgia, 
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.47.110 (West 2007 
& Supp. 2011) (180 days); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-2-310(b)(1), 5-2-310(b)(2)(A) (2006 & Supp. 2011) 
(requiring report after ten months and hearing after a “reasonable period of time,” but not to exceed 
one year of commitment); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1370(b)(1) (West 2011) (ninety days); COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 16-8.5-116(2) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011) (within three months after commitment); D.C. 
CODE § 24-531.03(f)(1) (LexisNexis 2005) (the defendant can be committed up to forty-five days for 
evaluation after found incompetent to stand trial); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-130(c) (2008 & Supp. 2011) 
(ninety days); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-212(2) (2004 & Supp. 2011) (ninety days); 725 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 5/104-17(e) (West 2006) (thirty days); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-3-3(a) (West 2004) 
(ninety days); IOWA CODE ANN. § 812.7 (West 2003 & Supp. 2011) (thirty days); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 22-3303(1) (2007) (ninety days); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 101-D(5)(A) (2003 & Supp. 2010) 
(thirty days); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 3-106(c)(1)(i) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2011) (must 
hold reconsideration hearing within a year); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 16(b) (West 2003) 
(sixty days); MISS. UNIFORM R. CIR. & COUNTY CT. PRAC. 9.06 (2010) (requiring report at least four 
months after defendant deemed incompetent to stand trial); MO. ANN. STAT. § 552.020(11)(1) (West 
2002) (six months); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-221(3)(a) (2011) (ninety days); NEB. REV. STAT. 
§ 29-1823(2) (2008) (six months); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 178.450(2) (West 2000 & Supp. 2011) 
(requiring report within three months if charged with misdemeanor and monthly afterward; requiring 
report within six months if charged with a felony and every six months thereafter); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2C:4-6(c) (West 2005 & Supp. 2011) (requiring a hearing within three months); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 31-9-1.3(A)(2) (LexisNexis 2000) (ninety days); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 730.40(1), 730.50(1) 
(McKinney 2011) (allowing hearing after ninety days if charged with a misdemeanor, or one year if 
charged with a felony, but never specifically requiring inquiry into whether a defendant will attain 
competency in the foreseeable future. However, presumably this hearing is to inquire into a 
defendant’s ability to attain competency in the future, and thus this statutory provision has been placed 
within this section.); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 161.370(3)–(4) (West 2003 & Supp. 2011) (allowing 
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from a low of thirty days
64
 to a high of one year.
65
 However, most states 
limit commitments for this purpose to between sixty and one hundred 
eighty days.
66
 Some states—such as Nevada,67 New York,68 and 
Washington
69—place limitations on this duration based upon the type of 
crime with which a defendant is charged. While commendably placing 
limitations on this initial commitment, scholars note that these states may 
not comply with Jackson’s spirit because predicting future competence has 
little to do with the severity of one’s alleged crime.70 
3. States Rehashing Jackson’s Language Without Delineating a 
Durational Limit 
Two states simply restate Jackson’s language without providing any 
specific durational limit on commitment for predicting restorability.
71
 
Hawaii, for example, provides that “[w]ithin a reasonable time following 
any commitment . . . the director of health shall report to the court on 
whether the defendant presents a substantial likelihood of becoming fit to 
 
 
sixty days for director of an institution to prepare a report; ninety days until he must notify the court); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-10A-14 (2004) (four months); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-7-301(c) (2007 & 
Supp. 2010) (six months); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.073(b) (West 2006 & Supp. 2010) 
(120 days); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15-6(2) (LexisNexis 2008) (after ninety days, with a possible 
ninety-day extension); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.3(B) (West 2007 & Supp. 2011) (six months); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.77.086(1) (West 2002 & Supp. 2011) (ninety days if a felony); WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 10.77.088(1)(a)(i) (West 2002 & Supp. 2011) (fourteen days if a misdemeanor); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-11-303(g)(i) (1995) (ninety days with possible ninety-day extension). 
 64. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 101-D(5)(A) (2003 & Supp. 2010) (thirty days).  
 65. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-2-310(b)(1), 5-2-310(b)(2)(A) (2006 & Supp. 2011) 
(requiring report after ten months and hearing after a “reasonable period of time,” but not to exceed 
one year of commitment); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 3-106(c)(1)(i) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 
2011) (must hold hearing within a year of commitment). 
 66. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 16(b) (West 2003) (sixty days); IND. CODE 
ANN. § 35-36-3-3(a) (West 2004) (ninety days); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.3(B) (West 2007 & Supp. 
2011) (six months). 
 67. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 178.450(2) (West 2000 & Supp. 2011). 
 68. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 730.40(1), 730.50(1) (McKinney 2011). 
 69. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.77.086 (West 2002 & Supp. 2011) (ninety days if a felony); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.77.088(1)(a)(i) (West 2002 & Supp. 2011) (fourteen days if a 
misdemeanor). 
 70. See Morris & Meloy, supra note 45, at 18 (“In Jackson, the Court conditioned an 
incompetent defendant's treatment on progress toward the goal of restoration to competence. A 
defendant charged with a serious crime is not by that fact more difficult to treat or less responsive to 
treatment than a defendant charged with a less serious crime.”). 
 71. The states are Hawaii and Pennsylvania. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 704-406(3) 
(LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2010); 50 PA. STAT. ANN. § 7403(d) (West 2001) (“Nor shall [the 
defendant] in any event be detained on the criminal charge longer than the reasonable period of time 
necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the 
foreseeable future.”). 
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proceed in the future.”72 These states do not comply with Jackson because 
while Jackson left specific durational limitations undefined in an effort to 
leave this determination to the states, a state cannot rely upon this same 
reasoning.
73
 
B. State Responses to Jackson’s Directive Requiring Limits Upon the 
Ultimate Duration of Commitment for Restoration of Competency 
Jackson’s most important holding was a blanket ban on indefinite 
commitment of defendants deemed incompetent to stand trial.
74
 As a 
result, states must institute an upper limit on commitments for competency 
restoration based solely on a defendant’s incompetency to stand trial. 
Overall, forty states provide some upper limit on commitments or skirt the 
issue entirely by allowing commitment only when factors other than 
incompetency to stand trial are present.
75
 Eleven states, however, evade 
Jackson’s most sacred holding by failing to provide a ceiling on such 
commitments.
76
 State provisions within this part evoke four distinct 
categories: (1) states avoiding Jackson by allowing commitment only upon 
 
 
 72. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 704-406(3) (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2010). However, as of 
publication, the Hawaii legislature was in the process of revising this statute to mandate short 
commitment periods for petty and nonviolent misdemeanors—periods short enough to potentially 
preclude the need to ask whether the defendant will attain competency in the foreseeable future. See 
S.B. 2726, 25th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2010). 
 73. See Morris & Meloy, supra note 45, at 9 (finding states that “merely parrot” Jackson’s 
language do not address the required definitional inquiry). 
 74. See ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 45, at 114 (“Clearly the Supreme Court is concluding 
that limits need to be set on the type and length of commitment of incompetent defendants . . . .”); 
Morris & Meloy, supra note 45, at 13 (“The very essence of Jackson is the Court’s prohibition against 
indeterminately confining incompetent defendants.”).  
 75. These states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
 76. These states are: Florida, Hawaii, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Wyoming. 
 This problematic latter category also might include the federal statute. Under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 4241(d)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2010), if a defendant is deemed incompetent to stand trial, he or she can 
be committed for four months while a prediction of restorability is made. If it is predicted that a 
defendant will attain competency, he or she can be committed “for an additional reasonable period of 
time until his mental condition is so improved that trial may proceed” or until “the pending charges 
against him are disposed of according to law”—whichever comes first. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241(d)(2)(A)–
(B) (2006 & Supp. 2010). 
 However, 18 U.S.C. § 4247(e)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. 2010) requires that “[t]he director of the 
facility in which a person is committed pursuant to section 4241 shall prepare semiannual reports.” 
Thus, continued commitment under § 4241(d)(2)(A) extends from a possible ten-month stay to a 
seemingly indefinite duration. 
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a finding of dangerousness or by only allowing civil commitments;
77
 (2) 
states tying commitment length to the defendant’s alleged crime or 
potential maximum sentence;
78
 (3) states providing a bright-line upper 
 
 
 77. These states are: Alabama, Delaware, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, North 
Carolina, Tennessee, and Vermont. See ALA. CODE § 15-16-21 (LexisNexis 1995) (“until he is 
restored to his right mind”). However, commitment can only occur with a finding of dangerousness to 
the public and oneself. Otherwise a defendant must be treated in outpatient fashion. See ALA. R. CRIM. 
PROC. 11.6(c)(3)(i) (LexisNexis 2009). This commitment, however, must only be revisited after the 
first six months and then every year thereafter, with no upper limit. ALA. R. CRIM. PROC. 11.6(d)(1) 
(LexisNexis 2009).  
 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 403(b) (2007 & Supp. 2010) (stating that court must review 
commitment after one year to determine if “public safety will not be endangered by the [defendant’s] 
release”); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 3-106(a) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2011) (court can set 
bail and release defendant if “not dangerous, as a result of a mental disorder or mental retardation, to 
self or the person or property of others”). But see MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 3-107(a)(1)–(3) 
(LexisNexis 2008) (allowing for dismissal of charges after time periods spanning three to ten years, 
depending upon severity of crime charged). 
 See MINN. R. CRIM. PROC. 20.01, subdiv. 3 (West 2010) (providing for only civil commitment 
upon finding defendant incompetent to proceed); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 178.460(4)(b) (West 2000 
& Supp. 2011) (state can recommit defendant only if “the defendant is dangerous to himself or herself 
or to society”). In Nevada, however, commitment cannot last beyond “the longest period of 
incarceration provided for the crime or crimes with which the person is charged or 10 years, whichever 
period is shorter.” NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 178.460(5) (West 2000 & Supp. 2011). 
 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135:17-a(II) (2005) (permitting commitment only pursuant to civil 
proceedings); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1002(b)(1), 15A-1004(b) (2007) (allowing for only civil 
commitment); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-7-301(b)(5) (2007 & Supp. 2010) (requiring commitment only 
if defendant is found dangerous, but not placing any limitation upon duration of commitment); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 4820(2)–(4) (2009) (indicating that only civil commitment can be pursued upon 
finding of incompetence). 
 78. These states are: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, 
Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 12.47.110(a)–
(b) (West 2007 & Supp. 2011) (allowing commitment for two ninety-day initial periods, then 
additional six-month period if defendant is charged with a felony crime involving force and remains 
dangerous; commitment is optional if the defendant is charged with a misdemeanor); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-4515(A) (2010) (twenty-one months or maximum sentence, whichever is less); see also 
Nowell v. Rees, 199 P.3d 654 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that trial court cannot issue commitment 
order if defendant will not achieve competency within twenty-one months).  
 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1370(c)(1) (West 2011) (three years or maximum time defendant can be 
sentenced for charged crime, whichever is less); see also In re Polk, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 389, 392–93 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1999) (describing process after maximum period of commitment has been reached). 
 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-8.5.116(1) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011) (up to maximum period 
of time for which defendant can be sentenced); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-56d(i) (West 2009 & 
Supp. 2011) (up to eighteen months or maximum sentence, whichever is less); D.C. CODE § 24-
531.05(b) (LexisNexis 2005) (“not to exceed 180 days in the aggregate”). But see D.C. CODE § 24-
531.05(c) (LexisNexis 2005) (if charged with a violent offense, the defendant can be committed for 
consecutive 180-day periods); D.C. CODE § 24-531.05(d)(1) (LexisNexis 2005) (“[I]npatient treatment 
may last no longer than the maximum possible sentence that the defendant could have received if 
convicted of the pending charges.”). 
 See IOWA CODE ANN. § 812.9(1) (West 2003 & Supp. 2011) (eighteen months or maximum 
sentence for crime charged, whichever comes first); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 648(B)(1) (2003 
& Supp. 2011) (tying commitment to maximum sentence); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.2034(1) 
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limit;
79
 and (4) states failing to respond by allowing potentially indefinite 
 
 
(West 1999) (providing that commitment cannot exceed “15 months or 1/3 of the maximum sentence 
the defendant could receive if convicted of the charges against him, whichever is lesser”); N.Y. CRIM. 
PROC. LAW § 730.50(3) (McKinney 2011) (“[T]he first order of retention and all subsequent orders of 
retention must not exceed two-thirds of the authorized maximum term of imprisonment for the highest 
class felony charged in the indictment or for the highest class felony of which he was convicted.”). 
However, if the defendant is accused of a misdemeanor, commitment cannot last longer than the initial 
ninety-day detention period. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.40(1) (McKinney 2011). 
 See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-04-08(1) (1997) (stating that commitment must end by the 
“expiration of the maximum period for which the defendant could be sentenced”); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. §§ 2945.38(C)(1)–(4) (LexisNexis 2010) (limiting treatment duration to one year if most serious 
offense charged with is violent felony or conspiracy to commit a violent felony, six months if charged 
with lesser felony, sixty days if charged with first- or second-degree misdemeanor, and thirty days if 
charged with other misdemeanor); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 161.370(6)(a)–(b) (West 2003 & Supp. 
2011) (the shorter of three years or the maximum sentence); 50 PA. STAT. ANN. § 7403(f) (West 2001) 
(“In no instance, except in cases of first and second degree murder, shall the proceedings be stayed for 
a period in excess of the maximum sentence of confinement that may be imposed for the crime or 
crimes charged or ten years, whichever is less. In cases of a charge of first or second degree murder, 
there shall be no limit on the period during which proceedings may be stayed.”); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§ 40.1-5.3-3(j) (2006) (no longer than “period of time equal to two thirds (2/3) of the maximum term 
of imprisonment for the most serious offense with which the defendant is charged. If the maximum 
term for the most serious offense charged is life imprisonment or death, the court shall for the purpose 
of computation deem such offense to be punishable by a maximum term of thirty (30) years.”); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-10A-15 (2004) (maximum sentence if charged with a Class A or B felony, but 
no limitations discussed for lesser crimes); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-15-6(6), (8), (10), (13) 
(LexisNexis 2008) (defendant can be committed for lesser of one year or maximum sentence unless 
accused of murder or aggravated murder, in which case defendant can be committed for up to 5.5 
years); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-169.3(C)–(D), (F) (West 2007 & Supp. 2011) (forty-five days if a 
specified misdemeanor, up to five years or a defendant’s maximum sentence if a specified felony, and 
indefinitely if charged with capital murder); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.77.086(4) (West 2002 & 
Supp. 2011) (providing that if charged with a felony, defendants can only be committed for a six-
month period following two initial ninety-day periods for evaluation if they are found to be 
dangerous); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.77.088(1)(a)(i) (West 2002 & Supp. 2011) (providing that if 
charged with a misdemeanor, defendants can only be committed for up to fourteen days); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 971.14(5)(a) (West 2007 & Supp. 2010) (one year or maximum sentence, whichever is less). 
 79. These states are: Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Massachusetts, South Carolina, Texas, and West Virginia. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-310(b)(2)(A) 
(2006 & Supp. 2011) (one year). But see J.W. Looney, The Arkansas Approach to Competency to 
Stand Trial: “Nailing Jelly To A Tree,” 62 ARK. L. REV. 683, 685 (2009) (discussing difficulty with 
making this determination).  
 See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-130(c)(3) (2008 & Supp. 2011) (nine months); IDAHO CODE ANN. 
§ 18-212(2) (2004) (up to 270 total days); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/104-23(b) (West 2006) (one 
year). But see 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/104-25(d)(1)–(2) (West 2006) (providing that after 
ensuing discharge hearing, the State can further commit a defendant for up to five years when charged 
with certain felonies); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/104-25(g)(4) (West 2006) (noting that even if 
defendants are committed after a discharge hearing, this period cannot exceed the maximum sentence 
they could receive under statute).  
 See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-3-3(b) (West 2004) (six months); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3303(2) 
(2007) (six months); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.110(2) (LexisNexis 2008) (providing no limitation 
on amount of reissued commitment orders court can provide). But see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 504.060(1) (LexisNexis 2008) (defining “foreseeable future” as “not more than [360] days”); 
Winchell, supra note 3, at 196 (confirming that Kentucky courts have “interpreted the statute to mean 
that a defendant with a substantial probability of attaining competency has 360 days to do so”).  
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commitment.
80
 
 
 
 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 16(b) (West 2003) (sixty days, and then civil commitment 
proceedings must commence); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-23-430(3) (2002 & Supp. 2010) (up to sixty 
days); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.080(a) (West 2006 & Supp. 2010) (allowing only one 
sixty-day extension period after initial 120-day commitment period); TEX. CRIM. PRAC. GUIDE 
§ 53.05[2] (LexisNexis 2011) (describing in detail Texas process for commitment of incompetent 
defendants); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-6A-3(f) (LexisNexis 2008) (nine months).  
 80. These states are: Florida, Hawaii, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Wyoming. See FLA. R. CRIM. PROC. 3.212(c)(6) (West 2007) 
(allowing commitment orders to be issued after every year). But see FLA. R. CRIM. PROC. 3.213(b) 
(West 2007 & Supp. 2011) (providing for release or initiation of civil proceedings after five years for 
felony or one year for misdemeanor, but only if “there is no substantial probability that the defendant 
will become mentally competent to stand trial”). This allows for potentially indefinite commitments if 
a defendant is continually found likely to become competent in the foreseeable future; see also Zabalo 
v. State, 513 So. 2d 701 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (allowing commitment after five-year period).  
 See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 704-406(2) (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2010) (providing that the 
State will not proceed with charges if “so much time has elapsed since the commitment or release on 
conditions of the defendant that it would be unjust to resume the proceeding”). But see State v. Raitz, 
621 P.2d 352 (Haw. 1980) (reading in language from Jackson and remanding one-year detention for 
determination if it exceeded reasonable bounds).  
 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 101-D(5)(A) (2003 & Supp. 2010) (providing for 
recommitment within one year, with no limitations thereafter); MISS. UNIFORM R. CIR. & COUNTY CT. 
PRAC. 9.06 (2010) (“If within a reasonable period of time after commitment under the provisions of 
this rule, there is neither a determination that there is substantial probability that the defendant will 
become mentally competent to stand trial nor progress toward that goal, the judge shall order that civil 
proceedings . . . be instituted.”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 552.020(11)(5) (West 2002 & Supp. 2011) 
(providing that recommitment proceedings can continually occur in six-month increments); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 46-14-221(2)(a) (2011) (allowing for commitment “for so long as the unfitness endures 
or until disposition of the defendant is made pursuant to this section, whichever occurs first”); NEB. 
REV. STAT. § 29-1823(1) (2008) (allowing for commitment “until such time as the disability may be 
removed”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-6(c) (West 2005) (laying out potentially perpetual cycle of six-
month reviews). But see State v. Gaffey, 456 A.2d 511, 518 (N.J. 1983) (“In conclusion, we hold that a 
criminal indictment shall be dismissed with prejudice under N.J.S.A. [§] 2C:4-6(c) when it is 
determined that an adequate period of time has elapsed during which the defendant has been 
institutionalized and has remained unfit to be tried.”).  
 See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-1.3(E) (LexisNexis 2000) (stating that the State will only proceed to 
civil commitment or release if defendant is found not to be making progress). But see N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 31-9-1.4 (LexisNexis 2000) (emphasizing need for action when “there is not a substantial 
probability that the defendant will become competent to proceed in a criminal case within a reasonable 
period of time not to exceed nine months from the date of the original finding of incompetency”). 
Given New Mexico’s emphasis on a nine-month period, it is possible that the legislature intended this 
to serve as the upper limit to commitment—though there is no mention of what occurs if a defendant is 
deemed restorable. However, pursuant to N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-1.5(D) (LexisNexis 2000), New 
Mexico will hold a hearing on the sufficiency of the evidence if the defendant is accused of a violent 
felony, and, if substantiated, the defendant can remain committed until the maximum sentence he or 
she could receive has been reached.  
 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1175.8 (West 2003) (“If the medical supervisor reports that the 
person appears to have achieved competency after a finding of incompetency, the court shall hold 
another competency hearing to determine if the person has achieved competency. If competency has 
been achieved, the criminal proceedings shall be resumed.”). However, under OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
22, § 1175.5(2) (West 2003 & Supp. 2011), the jury at a competency hearing must decide whether the 
defendant can achieve competency within a “reasonable period of time.” And, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
22, § 1175.1(6) (West 2003 & Supp. 2011) defines a “reasonable period of time” as an individual’s 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss3/5
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1. States Providing for Commitment Based Upon Dangerousness or 
Only Via Civil Commitment Proceedings 
Nine states avoid Jackson altogether by allowing for commitment only 
if factors other than incompetence to stand trial are present—namely 
“dangerousness” or similar factors reminiscent of civil commitment 
proceedings.
81
 Because Jackson’s holding was limited to defendants 
“committed solely on account of [their] incapacity to proceed to trial,”82 
these states avoid confronting Jackson’s mandate.  
2. States Providing a Ceiling on Commitments Stemming from the 
Underlying Charges and/or Potential Sentence 
Twenty states limit the duration of an incompetent defendant’s 
commitment based upon the charges facing the defendant or the potential 
sentence if convicted.
83
 Five of these twenty states limit this duration 
based upon the severity of the crime charged,
84
 while five other states 
premise a durational limit upon the possible sentence a defendant could 
receive.
85
 The ten remaining states reference either a possible sentence or a 
specific upper limit—whichever arises first—to define this durational 
limit.
86
  
 
 
maximum sentence or two years, whichever is less. Despite this, such “reasonable period of time” 
seemingly only applies to a determination of whether a defendant will achieve competence or not. 
Thus, because there is no mention of connecting “reasonable period of time” to an upper limit on 
commitment if a defendant is deemed restorable, it appears that Oklahoma does not accord with 
Jackson’s mandate to limit indefinite commitments solely on account of a defendant’s inability to 
attain competency.  
 See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-11-303(g)(ii) (1995) (“[T]he commitment of the accused at a 
designated facility shall continue until the head of the facility reports to the court that in his opinion 
the accused is fit to proceed . . . .”). 
 81. These states are: Alabama, Delaware, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, North 
Carolina, Tennessee, and Vermont. See supra note 77. 
 82. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). 
 83. These states are: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, 
Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. See supra note 78. 
 84. These states are Alaska, New York, Utah, Virginia, and Washington. It should be noted, 
however, that Utah could fit into any sub-category within this part, as it provides durational limitations 
on commitment based upon a potential sentence or a hard ceiling, as well as provides differing periods 
of commitment for exceptionally serious crimes. 
 85. These states are: Colorado, District of Columbia, Louisiana, North Dakota, and South 
Dakota. 
 86. These states are: Arizona, California, Connecticut, Iowa, Michigan, Ohio, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin.  
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Maximum period of commitment within this category of states varies 
wildly. If accused of a misdemeanor in Washington, a defendant can be 
committed for only fourteen days.
87
 In California, however, a similar 
defendant can be committed for the lesser of three years or the maximum 
sentence for the crime charged.
88
 Additionally, a defendant charged with a 
crime punishable by life imprisonment in Rhode Island can be committed 
for twenty years.
89
 Moreover, a defendant charged with first- or second-
degree murder in Pennsylvania faces no cap on commitment.
90
 This 
disparity demonstrates that while having answered Jackson’s call to 
action, many states within this category have not fully addressed the 
problem of indefinite commitment of incompetent defendants. 
Some scholars maintain that tying a defendant’s alleged crime or 
potential sentence to limitations on duration of commitment violates 
Jackson’s spirit because regaining competence has little to do with the 
type of crime with which a defendant has been charged.
91
 Another pair of 
scholars, however, maintain that this approach might be the most practical 
way of ensuring a defendant is not committed for an extended duration on 
a relatively minor charge.
92
 Further, one study found that defendants most 
incompetent and least likely to regain competence in the foreseeable future 
were those accused of low-level crimes.
93
 Thus, tying the length of 
commitment to a potential sentence or the severity of the alleged crime 
may ensure defendants accused of low-level crimes will be either civilly 
committed or released in compliance with Jackson, which requires that 
commitment “bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the 
individual is committed.”94  
 
 
 87. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.77.088(1)(a)(i) (West 2002 & Supp. 2011). 
 88. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1370(c)(1) (West 2011). 
 89. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5.3-3(j) (2006). 
 90. 50 PA. STAT. ANN. § 7403(f) (West 2001). 
 91. See Morris & Meloy, supra note 45, at 18 (“Because progress in treatment cannot be 
measured by the seriousness of the criminal charge, statutes authorizing treatment for the maximum 
possible sentence are not compatible with the Court’s progress requirement.”); Nicholson & Kugler, 
supra note 47, at 366 (“Type of offense likely bears a stronger relation to the decision to refer than it 
does to the decision about competency itself.”). 
 92. See ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 45, at 119 (“An exception to this . . . is the case that has 
a maximum sentence which is less than the treatment limit.”). 
 93. Barry Rosenfeld & Kerri Ritchie, Competence to Stand Trial: Clinician Reliability and the 
Role of Offense Severity, 43 J. FORENSIC SCI. 151 (1998). 
 94. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). Of note, one scholar goes so far as to suggest 
that the seriousness of the charges should affect the determination of competence, using a so-called 
“sliding scale” method to demand a higher level of competence for more serious crimes. See Alec 
Buchanan, Competency to Stand Trial and the Seriousness of the Charge, 34 J. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY & L. 458, 459–65 (2006). 
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3. States Offering a Bright-Line Limit on Commitments 
Eleven states have directly responded to Jackson’s mandate by 
providing a ceiling on the commitment of defendants deemed incompetent 
to stand trial.
95
 Such time periods range from sixty days
96
 to five years for 
defendants charged with exceptionally serious crimes.
97
 Most states in this 
category, however, do not allow commitments to exceed nine months.
98
 
4. States Without a Cap on Duration of Commitments in 
Contravention of Jackson 
Eleven states fail to comply with Jackson’s mandate by refusing to 
offer a durational limit on commitment of an incompetent defendant or by 
simply rehashing Jackson’s language without providing any legislative 
guidance on how courts should apply this restriction.
99
 States in the former 
category are typified by New Jersey, which allows for continual six-month 
commitment orders with no definitive upper limit.
100
 States in the latter 
category are exemplified by Wyoming, which provides that “the 
commitment of the accused at a designated facility shall continue until the 
head of the facility reports to the court that in his opinion the accused is fit 
to proceed.”101 By endorsing possibly unlimited commitment, these states 
contravene what the Jackson Court sought to avoid—indefinite 
commitment of defendants deemed incompetent to stand trial. 
 
 
 95. These states are: Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Massachusetts, South Carolina, Texas, and West Virginia. See supra note 79. 
 96. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 16(b) (West 2003) (sixty days, and then civil 
commitment proceedings must commence); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-23-430(3) (2002 & Supp. 2010) (up 
to sixty days). 
 97. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/104-23(b) (West 2006) (one year). But see 725 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 5/104-25(d)(1)–(2) (West 2006) (after ensuing discharge hearing, can further commit 
defendant for up to five years when charged with certain felonies). However, under 725 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 5/104-25(g)(4) (West 2006), even if committed after a discharge hearing, this period 
cannot exceed the maximum sentence a defendant could receive under statute. 
 98. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-3-3(b) (West 2004) (six months); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-
3303(2) (2007) (six months); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-6A-3(f) (LexisNexis 2008) (up to nine months). 
 99. These states are: Florida, Hawaii, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Wyoming. However, New Mexico debatably does not fit this 
mold. See supra note 80. 
 100. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-6(c) (West 2005). 
 101. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-11-303(g)(ii) (1995). 
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C. Conclusions 
Overall, three states do not define “reasonable” for the purposes of 
commitment to predict restorability,
102
 and eleven states fail to place any 
upper limit on the ultimate duration of a defendant’s commitment for 
restoration of competency to stand trial.
103
 As a result, these states have 
failed to address Jackson’s fundamental questions.  
Further, there is alarming variation among states that have attempted to 
answer Jackson’s mandates. Defendants committed for predictions of 
restorability in Maine must have such analysis completed within thirty 
days,
104
 while in Maryland the same inquiry can lawfully take up to a 
year.
105
 Further, defendants deemed restorable face commitment for only 
sixty days in Massachusetts,
106
 while the same defendant arrested in Rhode 
Island can be committed for twenty years
107—or potentially indefinitely in 
Pennsylvania.
108
 These examples reflect an overall disparity that ensures 
defendants in many states can likely be committed for longer “than the 
reasonable period of time necessary” to predict restorability or past the 
point when commitment is no longer “justified by progress toward 
[restoration].”109  
Given this patchwork of state provisions, it is evident that even thirty-
six years after Jackson, incompetent defendants in many states lack basic 
due process safeguards.
110
 The following part offers insight into social 
science research in an attempt to answer Jackson’s fundamental questions 
by determining what due process should require. 
IV. RESEARCH EXAMINING DURATIONAL LIMITS 
Social science scholarship addressing durational limitations on 
commitment for predicting restorability and commitment for restoration 
demonstrates that only limited periods of time are necessary for either 
 
 
 102. See supra notes 56 and 71. 
 103. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
 104. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 101-D(5)(A) (2003 & Supp. 2010). 
 105. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 3-106(c)(1)(i) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2011). 
 106. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 16(b) (West 2003). 
 107. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5.3-3(j) (2006). 
 108. 50 PA. STAT. ANN. § 7403(f) (West 2001). 
 109. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). Additionally, it should be noted that the 
Jackson Court itself found that three-and-one-half years of commitment without improvement 
offended due process in Jackson’s case. Id. This further casts doubt on the constitutionality of state 
statutes allowing for extended commitment. 
 110. See Morris & Meloy, supra note 45, at 9 (finding similarly). 
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inquiry—thus signaling that many states likely exceed the bounds of what 
due process should require for one or both of these inquiries.
111
 However, 
scholarship also showcases the need for further research regarding 
standards to predict and evaluate competency before definitive durational 
limits can be authoritatively ascertained.
112
 The following parts expound 
upon these findings. 
A. Research Defining Durational Limits on Commitment for Predicting a 
Defendant’s Restorability 
Though research on the duration commitment for prediction of 
restorability should span is extremely limited,
113
 available literature 
suggests a short period of time (e.g., thirty days or less) is more than 
adequate. Ronald Roesch and Stephen Golding, in their 1980 treatment of 
the issue, surveyed twelve proposals for durational limitations and found 
that most invoked a six-month treatment limitation as an adequate amount 
of time.
114
 However, these findings conflict with a recent work by Michael 
Finkle et al., which found that the process for interviewing and reporting 
opinions on a defendant’s competency can range from one day to several 
weeks.
115
 Further, the late Bruce Winick reiterated that initial competency 
assessments can occur over a period “of several days or weeks.”116 These 
findings are supported by the many states that require prediction of future 
competency at the initial competency hearing—which often occurs on a 
more truncated timetable than a separate hearing devoted to this finding.
117
 
. Finally, it is instructive that many states have memorialized short 
durational limits for commitment predicated on predicting restorability in 
their statutory provisions—evidencing the fact that this inquiry can be 
completed within short periods of time.
118
 Thus, because this inquiry 
 
 
 111. See discussion infra Parts IV.A–B. 
 112. See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
 113. See generally Karen L. Hubbard, Patricia A. Zapf & Kathleen A. Ronan, Competency 
Restoration: An Examination of the Differences Between Defendants Predicted Restorable and Not 
Restorable to Competency, 27 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 127 (2003); Gregory B. Leong, Commentary: 
Restorability of Incompetence to Stand Trial—Implications Beyond Predictive Equations, 35 J. AM. 
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 44, 44–45 (2007) (setting out research and approaches for predicting 
competency, but declining to discuss duration in making determinations). 
 114. See ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 45, at 116–19. 
 115. Michael J. Finkle et al., Competency Courts: A Creative Solution for Restoring Competency 
to the Competency Process, 27 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 767, 774 (2009). 
 116. See Winick, supra note 3, at 931–32. 
 117. See supra note 57 and accompanying text; see also Hubbard, Zapf & Ronan, supra note 113, 
at 136 (pertaining to Alabama law). 
 118. See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/104-17(e) (West 2006) (thirty days); IOWA CODE 
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can—and in many states must—be completed within 30 days or less, it 
appears that states allowing for commitment extending beyond thirty days 
likely fail to properly protect a defendant’s right to due process as laid out 
in Jackson—which requires commitment of a defendant span only the time 
necessary to predict future competence. This carries immediate 
consequences, as Finkle et al. discuss, because “the longer it takes to 
complete an evaluation . . . the greater the risk that the defendant’s 
condition could be deteriorating further.”119 Therefore, a disconnect exists 
between durational limits set forth in research and a contingent of state 
provisions providing for extended commitment to predict an incompetent 
defendant’s ability to regain competency. 
B. Research Defining Durational Limits on Commitment of Incompetent 
Defendants for Restoration of Competency 
A review of literature suggests that approximately six months may 
delineate the upper limit of time needed to restore an incompetent 
defendant’s competency to stand trial. One scholar, Debra Pinals, recently 
encapsulated four studies describing the time needed to restore 
incompetent defendants to competence.
120
 First, in 1979, Linda Pendleton 
found an average treatment period of 104 days for incompetent defendants 
attaining competency.
121
 H. Richard Lamb found that of the defendants 
within his study who achieved competence, “the median length of 
hospitalization was 4.5 months”—though the time from arrest to a court 
determination of competence was ten months.
122
 In a study by Steven K. 
Hoge et al., a small group of incompetent defendants were successfully 
restored in an average of 100 days.
123
 Additionally, Stephen G. Noffsinger 
found that after the implementation of a novel competency restoration 
program, the average length of stay for incompetent defendants achieving 
competency was approximately eighty days.
124
  
 
 
ANN. § 812.7 (West 2003 & Supp. 2011) (within thirty days); see also supra notes 57–62 and 
accompanying text. 
 119. See Finkle et al., supra note 115, at 773. 
 120. Debra A. Pinals, Where Two Roads Meet: Restoration of Competence to Stand Trial From a 
Clinical Perspective, 31 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 81, 98–99 (2005). 
 121. Linda Pendleton, Treatment of Persons Found Incompetent to Stand Trial, 137 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 1098, 1100 (1980). 
 122. H. Richard Lamb, Incompetency to Stand Trial: Appropriateness and Outcome, 44 
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 754, 755 (1987). 
 123. Steven K. Hoge et al., Mentally Ill and Non-Mentally Ill Defendants’ Abilities to Understand 
Information Relevant to Adjudication: A Preliminary Study, 24 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 
187, 190 (1996) (97.9 days to be exact). 
 124. Stephen G. Noffsinger, Restoration to Competency Practice Guidelines, 45 INT’L J. 
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Further, Robert D. Miller, while proposing an outpatient evaluation 
schema, cited the results of three separate studies finding the average 
length of inpatient stay until restoration of competence was only six 
months—though defendants tended to stay longer because many states had 
much higher durational limits for such treatment.
125
 Finkle et al. reiterated 
a six-month finding in a recent literature review.
126
 Moreover, a 2008 
study in Indiana specifically focused upon restoration of competency 
found that 72.3 percent of defendants admitted to a forensic hospital from 
1988–2004 for competency restoration attained competency within six 
months.
127
 Additionally, 83.9 percent of the defendants in the study 
attained competency within one year.
128
 A more dated study of defendants 
found incompetent to stand trial in Michigan observed that the average 
length of stay until restoration of competency was 9.8 months for males 
and 5.4 months for females.
129
 
However, many studies have found even shorter restoration periods 
were adequate. Robert Nicholson and John McNulty found the average 
length of time for restoration of competency within their study was 63.7 
days, and less than 6 percent of defendants ultimately restored took longer 
than six months to achieve competence.
130
 Additionally, Kathleen Stafford 
and Dustin Wygant found that, of a small sample size of incompetent 
defendants, those achieving competence were restored within an average 
of 48.9 days.
131
  
Overall, these findings are far from definitive. They do, however, 
suggest that state statutes allowing for commitment exceeding 
approximately six months offend a defendant’s due process rights, as, on 
average, a defendant’s commitment no longer bears “some reasonable 
relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed” beyond that 
point.
132
 
 
 
OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 356, 360 (2001). 
 125. Robert D. Miller, Hospitalization of Criminal Defendants for Evaluation of Competence to 
Stand Trial or for Restoration of Competence: Clinical and Legal Issues, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 369, 
379 (2003). 
 126. See Finkle et al., supra note 115, at 775. 
 127. Douglas R. Morris & George F. Parker, Jackson’s Indiana: State Hospital Competence 
Restoration in Indiana, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 522, 528 (2008). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Carol T. Mowbray, A Study of Patients Treated as Incompetent to Stand Trial, 14 J. SOC. 
PSYCHIATRY 31, 33 (1979). 
 130. See Robert A. Nicholson & John L. McNulty, Outcome of Hospitalization for Defendants 
Found Incompetent to Stand Trial, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 371, 378 (1992). 
 131. Kathleen P. Stafford & Dustin B. Wygant, The Role of Competency to Stand Trial in Mental 
Health Courts, 23 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 245, 255 (2005). 
 132. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). 
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C. Limitations on Research Defining Durational Limits 
Scholarship thus shows that short periods of time for commitment 
surrounding prediction of restorability and commitment for restoration can 
adequately fulfill Jackson’s durational mandates. However, this research is 
limited in addressing a durational limitation on commitment for predicting 
future competence, and is unsettled when addressing a durational limit on 
commitment for competence restoration. These issues reflect the reality 
that mental health law has not adequately addressed workable, transferable 
methods to predict restorability and evaluate restoration.
133
 As literature 
frequently notes, there is no gold standard for evaluating competency,
134
 
and likewise there is no widely accepted standard in place from which 
mental health professionals can draw to predict future competency.
135
 
Forensic research has been remiss to develop a detailed understanding of 
factors best suited to aid in predicting and evaluating competency.
136
 As a 
result, some experts have long questioned what such an inquiry should 
entail.
137
 
This deficiency manifests itself in state provisions requiring periodic 
review of defendants deemed restorable and committed in furtherance of 
that goal. Jackson requires that when faced with an incompetent defendant 
 
 
 133. See Looney, supra note 79, at 700 (“It is unclear which variables best predict a particular 
defendant's restorability.”). 
 134. See Jessica Wilen Berg, Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, Constructing Competence: 
Formulating Standards of Legal Competence to Make Medical Decisions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 345, 
347 (1996) (“Presently there is a lack of both an authoritative framework for thinking about legal 
competence and clear standards for determining it. Cases and statutes generally lack sufficient analysis 
of competence and its different elements. Terms such as ‘understanding’ or ‘rationality’ may be poorly 
defined and used indiscriminately.”). 
 135. See Hubbard, Zapf & Ronan, supra note 113, at 130 (“On the basis of current inconsistent 
findings, it is not possible to conclude which variables are most accurate in predicting a defendant’s 
ability to be restored to competency.”); Morris & Parker, supra note 127, at 523 (“[S]urprisingly little 
research on competence restoration has been published.”).  
 136. See, e.g., Karen L. Hubbard & Patricia A. Zapf, The Role of Demographic, Criminal, and 
Psychiatric Variables in Examiners’ Predictions of Restorability to Competency to Stand Trial, 2 
INT’L J. FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH 145, 146 (2003) (“[I]nconsistent findings seem to indicate that no 
clear consensus yet exists about which variables best predict a defendant’s ability to regain 
competency.”); Leong, supra note 113, at 44 (“[P]ublished literature through 2006 has not proven to 
be particularly useful in assisting the psychiatrist in arriving at a determination of the likelihood of 
restoration.”). 
 137. See ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 45, at 119 (“[W]e simply have no way of predicting, 
with any reasonable degree of accuracy, the probability of regaining competency.”); Morris et al., 
supra note 2, at 227–29 (describing shortcomings in knowledge and practice regarding competency 
assessments). But see Douglas Mossman, Predicting Restorability of Incompetent Criminal 
Defendants, 35 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 34, 40 (2007) (“In contrast to findings in several 
previous publications, this study suggests that specific clinical data could help competence examiners 
assess restorability.”). 
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who “probably soon will be able to stand trial, his continued commitment 
must be justified by progress toward that goal.”138 This has been 
interpreted to require periodic review to ensure a defendant is progressing 
towards attaining competency.
139
 Thirty-nine states provide for periodic 
review in their statutory schemes.
140
 However, not one state dictates 
 
 
 138. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). 
 139. See Morris & Meloy, supra note 45, at 10–11 (“Although the language of Jackson does not 
impose a duty of judicial oversight, such a duty is implicit.”). 
 140. These states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, 
District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, 
Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See ALA. R. CRIM. PROC. 
11.6(f) (LexisNexis 2009) (requiring reports at least every ninety-one days); ALA. R. CRIM. PROC. 
11.6(d)(1) (LexisNexis 2009) (mandating court review after first six months, then every year 
thereafter); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.47.110(b) (West 2007 & Supp. 2011) (mirroring ninety-day 
hearings); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4514(A)(1)–(2) (2010) (for inpatient treatment, after the first 
120 days and then every 180 days thereafter; outpatient treatment, every sixty days); CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 1370(b)(1) (West 2011) (six-month intervals); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-8.5-116(2) (West 
2006 & Supp. 2011) (every three months); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-56d(k)(1) (West 2009 & 
Supp. 2011) (every ninety days when prior commitment order becomes invalid); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
11, § 403(b) (2007) (one year after initial hearing, then anytime thereafter upon the defendant’s 
motion); D.C. CODE §§ 24-531.06(a)(1)–(2) (LexisNexis 2005) (requiring hearings only upon the 
expiration of ordered commitment or upon a change in the defendant’s competence status); FLA. R. 
CRIM. PROC. 3.212(c)(5)–(6) (West 2007) (after first six months of commitment, and then every year 
thereafter); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-212(2) (2004) (after initial ninety days of commitment); 725 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/104-20 (West 2006) (every ninety days); IOWA CODE ANN. § 812.7 (West 2003 
& Supp. 2011) (within first thirty days, and then sixty days thereafter); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 504.110(1) (LexisNexis 2008) (after sixty days); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 648(B)(1) (2003 
& Supp. 2011) (“At any time after commitment . . . the court shall, within sixty days and after at least 
ten days notice to . . . defendant’s counsel . . . conduct a contradictory hearing to determine whether 
the . . . defendant is . . . incapable of standing trial . . . .”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 101-D(5)(A) 
(2003 & Supp. 2010) (requiring report after first thirty days; then, if defendant is recommitted, after 
sixty days and one year); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 3-106(c)(1)(i)–(iii) (LexisNexis 2008 & 
Supp. 2011) (noting that the court must hold reconsideration hearing within a year or within thirty days 
after defendant’s counsel or the State’s Attorney files a motion for reconsideration or within thirty 
days of receiving a Health Department report with new facts or circumstances); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 123, § 16(b) (West 2003) (review within sixty days of commitment); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 330.2038(1)(a) (West 1999) (every ninety days); MISS. UNIFORM R. CIR. & COUNTY CT. 
PRAC. 9.06 (2010) (every four months); MO. ANN. STAT. § 552.020(11)(5) (West 2002) (every six 
months); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-221(3)(a) (2011) (ninety days); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1823(2) 
(2008) (six months); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 178.450(2) (West 2000 & Supp. 2011) (monthly 
intervals for a misdemeanor after first report is filed; six month intervals for a felony after first report 
is filed); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-6(c) (West 2005) (every six months); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-
1.3(D)(1) (LexisNexis 2000) (nine months from commitment); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 730.50(2)–
(3) (McKinney 2011) (if the defendant is charged with a felony, a new order of retention is required 
after the first year and then every two years thereafter); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2945.38(F)(1)–(4) 
(LexisNexis 2010) (requiring reports whenever there is a change in defendant’s status, fourteen days 
before felony a commitment order expires, and ten days before a misdemeanor commitment order 
expires); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161.370(5) (West 2003 & Supp. 2011) (every 180 days); 50 PA. 
STAT. ANN. § 7403(c) (West 2001) (every ninety days); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5.3-3(k) (2006) (every 
six months, the director of the defendant’s institution shall prepare a report and petition the court for a 
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factors to consider when evaluating a defendant’s progress toward 
regaining competency.
141
  
This lack of guidance is problematic because courts and jurists—who 
are not well versed on mental health issues—typically defer to mental 
health professionals’ assessments of a defendant’s present and future 
competence.
142
 Unfortunately, these mental health professionals are 
operating without a well-developed understanding of how to best analyze 
these inquiries.
143
 Inconsistencies are therefore apt to arise in both 
evaluating and predicting competency, leaving durational definitions an 
inexact science under the present framework.
144
 Reliable methods to 
 
 
hearing); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-10A-14 (2004) (review after four months and again after one 
year); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-7-301(c) (2007 & Supp. 2010) (six months); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. 
ANN. art. 46B.077(b) (West 2006 & Supp. 2010) (“at least once during the commitment period”); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15-6(6) (LexisNexis 2008) (court must review one year from recommitment). 
But see UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-15-6(8)–(10) (LexisNexis 2008) (if charged with specified serious 
crimes, court can extend commitment orders up to thirty-six months and must review the defendant’s 
progress at least every eighteen months).  
 See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.3(B) (West 2007 & Supp. 2011) (every six months); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 10.77.086(4) (West 2002 & Supp. 2011) (mandating review if defendant is charged with 
a felony after each of two ninety-day periods of commitment, and then after possible six-month 
extension); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-6A-3(f) (LexisNexis 2008) (every three months); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 971.14(5)(b) (West 2007 & Supp. 2010) (three months, six months, nine months, and thirty 
days before end of commitment); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-11-303(g)(ii) (1995) (at least every three 
months). 
 141. See supra note 140. 
 142. See Melissa L. Cox & Patricia A. Zapf, An Investigation of Discrepancies Between Mental 
Health Professionals and the Courts in Decisions about Competency, 28 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 109, 
125 (2004) (finding that in course of study “[t]he court agreed with the mental health professional on 
326 of 327 cases”); David Freedman, When Is a Capitally Charged Defendant Incompetent to Stand 
Trial?, 32 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 127, 127 (2009) (“[B]oth defense counsel and the trial courts, 
more often than not, defer to the judgment of defendant competence of mental health professionals.”). 
 143. See Nicholson & Kugler, supra note 47, at 368 (“Despite the lack of crucial evidence on the 
mental health professional’s expertise in forensic matters, it is unlikely that the use of such 
professionals in court proceedings will diminish in the near future.”); Pinals, supra note 120, at 105–
06 (“[T]here are no clearly established means of accurately predicting who among defendants are 
restorable and who are not.”). This misunderstanding has also likely resulted in the wide variation 
among state provisions related to Jackson’s durational inquiries. See Miller, supra note 125, at 372 
(“This somewhat oracular pronouncement was sufficiently vague to cause different states to interpret it 
differently.”). 
 144. See Noffsinger, supra note 124, at 357 (“[T]here is a striking paucity of information dealing 
en point with the issue of restoring competence to stand trial.”). To remedy this shortcoming in 
information, Noffsinger advocates for “more research on competency restoration techniques.” Id.; see 
also Hubbard & Zapf, supra note 136, at 146 (“Furthermore, there is a lack of research that examines 
the efficacy of treatment for incompetent defendants and the ability of examiners to make accurate 
predictions about competency restoration.”). Without adequate understanding of techniques to predict 
and evaluate competence, as well as with a dearth of information on restoration techniques, it is not 
surprising that durational limits on commitment have not been investigated at length. See generally 
Nicholson & McNulty, supra note 130 (discussing difficulty in making determinations about 
restorability—and hence progress towards competence—given a dearth of guidance); Roesch, Hart & 
Zapf, supra note 4 (identifying difficulty in creating system to aid in competence determinations). 
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predict and evaluate competency are thus essential to defining durational 
limits, and therefore hold the key to fully realizing Jackson’s mandates.145  
In light of the constitutional ramifications at stake, further research and 
statutory change are needed regarding evaluation methods and durational 
limits surrounding prediction and restoration of a defendant’s competence 
to stand trial.
146
 The next part proposes accomplishment of these 
objectives via a cross-disciplinary working group of mental health 
professionals and legal experts. 
V. PROPOSAL FOR STATUTORY REVISION 
A. Need for Further Study 
Given the disconnect between many state statutory provisions and 
existing scholarship addressing Jackson’s durational inquiries, change is 
needed to ensure that these directives remain vibrant and due process 
respected.
147
 To address these shortcomings in the doctrine of competence, 
scholars have suggested the establishment of provisional trials,
148
 the 
ability to waive competency,
149
 and various methods of outpatient 
treatment.
150
 However, these proposals obscure the underlying problem, as 
disparity in treatment of incompetent defendants among states cannot be 
remedied until the forensic community better understands methodologies 
necessary to predict restorability and evaluate restoration.
151
  
 
 
 145. See Ronald Roesch & James R. P. Ogloff, Settings for Providing Criminal and Civil Forensic 
Mental Health Services, in MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: RESEARCH, POLICY AND SERVICES 191, 197 
(Bruce D. Sales & Saleem A. Shah eds., 1996) (“[I]t may not be possible for mental health 
professionals to assess the Jackson criterion of response to treatment, which of course raises questions 
about whether this criterion can actually be used as a basis for determining treatment length.”); see 
also MARK C. BARDWELL & BRUCE A. ARRIGO, CRIMINAL COMPETENCY ON TRIAL: THE CASE OF 
COLIN FERGUSON 33 (2002) (“[F]itness to stand trial standards utilize broad language which is flexible 
in application but, nonetheless, is a source of confusion.”). 
 146. Indeed, due process rights are equated to “fundamental fairness” in our nation’s legal 
framework. See Honorable David Souter, Remarks by Justice Souter, 99 GEO. L.J. 157, 158 (2010). 
 147. See Morris & Meloy, supra note 45, at 77–78 (calling for change in wake of finding states 
failing to meet Jackson’s requirements). 
 148. See ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 45, at 209–16. 
 149. See Winick, supra note 3, at 975–76. 
 150. See Perlin, supra note 6, at 214. 
 151. See Hubbard & Zapf, supra note 136, at 147 (“[M]ore research needs to be conducted to 
determine which predictors are most accurate in determining the restoration of competency.”); see also 
Berg, Appelbaum & Grisso, supra note 134, at 388–89 (“Clearly more research on these issues is 
necessary before conclusively establishing a legal standard of competence. At present, it may be 
sufficient to note that formulating a legal standard of competence is somewhat context specific, and as 
a result, different situations may require different application of those standards.”). 
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Further study is therefore needed to develop working methodologies 
for predicting restorability and evaluating restoration of a defendant 
deemed incompetent to stand trial.
152
 Such scholarship would help guide 
courts and allow for reasoned, accurate decisions surrounding a 
defendant’s competency.153 Additionally, evidenced by the disconnect 
between state provisions and scholarship addressing durational limits on 
prediction and restoration of incompetent defendants, further study of 
these lingering questions is needed to aid states in developing reasoned 
legislation that adequately fulfills Jackson’s due process requirements.154  
B. A Cross-Disciplinary Approach with an Old Adage 
Given this need, a cross-disciplinary working group comprised of 
mental health and legal experts in the doctrine of competency would be 
well suited to the task.
155
 This group would commission a study set upon 
developing a standardized, research-based model to use in predicting 
competency and evaluating restoration—taking into account the difference 
between general competency and legal competency.
156
 This model would 
then be used to garner answers to durational questions surrounding 
commitment for predicting restorability and commitment for restoration. 
 
 
 152. See supra Part IV.C.  
 153. See Morris et al., supra note 2, at 227–29 (describing shortcomings in judicial ability to 
determine incompetence). 
 154. See Finkle et al., supra note 115, at 783 (discussing the need for further research because 
“how long the average defendant needs inpatient treatment is unknown”). Additionally, the time for 
change may be now; sixteen of the states examined in this Note feature proposed legislation 
surrounding one or more of their Jackson provisions. These states are: Alaska, Georgia, Illinois, 
Hawaii, Kansas, Maryland, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, 
Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See H.B. 9, 26th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2009); S.B. 
391, 150th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2010); S.B. 2726, 25th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2010); H.B. 
5303, 96th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2010); H.B. 2518, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2010); H.B. 
1075, 428th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2011); A.B. 264, 75th Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2009); H.B. 1655, 
161st Leg. (N.H. 2010); S.B. 794, 2009 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2009); S.B. 79, 128th Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2009); H.B. 2496, 194th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2010); H.B. 3139, 
106th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2010); H.B. 631, 2009–2010 Leg. Sess. (Vt. 2010); S.B. 
5519, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2009); S.B. 492, 99th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2010); H.B. 4, 2010 
Budget Sess. (Wyo. 2010). 
 155. See BARDWELL & ARRIGO, supra note 145, at 130 (suggesting similar approach by proposing 
that “lawyers and clinical practitioners are best equipped” to resolve durational questions stemming 
from initial competency evaluations). 
 156. Many scholars have called for similar reform. See, e.g., Noffsinger, supra note 124, at 357 
(“[M]ore research on competency restoration techniques is called for.”). While scholars may debate 
whether this is an attainable goal, at least one recent work has synthesized data to better understand 
competency and proposed recommendations focused on developing a workable construct for 
evaluating and predicting competency—signaling that this goal can and must be met in light of 
Jackson. See generally Nicholson & Kugler, supra note 47. 
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Armed with its findings, this group would subsequently draft a model 
statute, supplying states with proper durational limits regarding treatment 
of incompetent defendants and an approved approach to predicting and 
evaluating competence that will allow both mental health and legal 
professionals to become well versed in its facets. The result would be the 
confluence of diverging professional paths, bridging the historic 
disconnect between scientists and jurists in the doctrine of competency to 
create workable guidelines in hopes of aiding implementation of Jackson’s 
mandates.
157
 
Armed with this leadership, states will have a model statute upon 
which to build a competency-to-proceed framework endorsed by the 
mental health and legal communities. In addition, courts will have 
scholarship and targeted studies to refer to when confronted with 
constitutional questions surrounding the commitment of incompetent 
defendants—potentially providing the impetus for change to lagging 
legislatures. In this way, a well-developed model would pave the way for 
increased protections aimed at defendants deemed incompetent to stand 
trial. 
This approach, featuring a group of scholars joining together to study a 
problem and propose a unifying solution to a statutory shortcoming, has 
frequently been employed to produce a host of socially useful 
legislation.
158
 This approach helped create the Model Penal Code, which 
has become widely implemented among the states.
159
 Further, the Model 
State Administrative Procedure Act arose from an analogous group 
approach and has been widely adopted.
160
 Additionally, the Uniform 
 
 
 157. See Longtain, supra note 2, at 1575 (“Until legislatures and courts define the standard for 
competency more narrowly, evaluators do not deserve blame for using clinical descriptions to assess 
defendants . . . .”). 
 158. This approach was exemplified in a recent work. See Peter A. Alces & Chris Byrne, Is it 
Time for the Restatement of Contracts, Fourth?, 11 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 195 (2009). Alces and Byrne note 
that: 
[D]uring the progressive era, both the ALI and the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) have proven to be two of the most influential legal 
institutions in the United States. Each organization has been essential in improving the 
administration of law through efforts to simplify the law by distilling its best principles and 
making its application uniform throughout the states. The ALI has done most of this 
simplification through their Restatements of law, while NCCUSL has accomplished the same 
through uniform laws.  
Id. at 196. 
 159. See John P. Frank, The American Law Institute, 1923–1998, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 615, 636–
37 (1998) (identifying the Model Penal Code as one of the American Law Institute’s “most successful 
projects”). 
 160. Anuradha Vaitheswaran & Thomas A. Mayes, The Role of Deference in Judicial Review of 
Agency Action: A Comparison of Federal Law, Uniform State Acts, and the Iowa APA, 27 J. NAT’L 
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Commercial Code features a similar success story.
161
 On a smaller scale, 
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners created a model 
Unfair Trade Practices Act that has gained widespread acceptance and 
helped foster uniformity in this area of the law within the states.
162
 
Similarly, to provide uniformity amid varying state statutes, the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) and the 
American Bar Association created the 1968 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 
to provide model legislation regarding organ donation—which most states 
subsequently adopted.
163
 Further, creation of a model statute by a group of 
experts has been deemed to be within “American jurisprudential 
traditions.”164 Thus, utilizing a collection of experts to develop a model 
statute in a quest for clarity and uniformity has produced some of the most 
influential legislation to date, and is widely accepted as a way to solve 
shortcomings within the law.  
Overall, faced with scholarship’s acknowledged need for further 
research and a constitutional backdrop yearning for statutory revision, 
similar success can be duplicated within the doctrine of competency.  
CONCLUSION 
Competency to stand trial issues go to the heart of our constitutional 
safeguard of due process, a requirement essential to the fairness upon 
which our nation’s judiciary was designed. Jackson v. Indiana held that 
due process requires durational limits be placed on both commitment for 
predicting competency and commitment for restoration of competency. 
Unfortunately, many states have failed to define, or have inadequately 
provided for, these durational limits. As a result, incompetent defendants 
face a patchwork and unsatisfactory set of state protections governing their 
due process rights.  
 
 
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 402, 418–19 (2007) (noting that the 1961 Model State Administrative 
Procedure Act has been adopted in some form by at least thirty states). 
 161. See Alces & Byrne, supra note 158, at 203 (describing the cooperative approach taken 
between the American Law Institute and National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws in creating and overseeing the Uniform Commercial Code). 
 162. Robert L. Tucker, Disappearing Ink: The Emerging Duty to Remove Invalid Policy 
Provisions, 42 AKRON L. REV. 519, 571 (2009). 
 163. Gloria J. Banks, Legal & Ethical Safeguards: Protection of Society’s Most Vulnerable 
Participants in a Commercialized Organ Transplantation System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 45, 66–69 
(1995).  
 164. G. Edward White, The American Law Institute and the Triumph of Modernist Jurisprudence, 
15 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 10 (1997) (noting additionally that ALI could have solved “uncertainty and 
complexity” in the law by the creation of model statutes) (internal quotation marks removed). 
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Available social science research confirms this inadequacy, 
demonstrating that due process should reflect shorter durational periods of 
commitment than many states currently provide for. This obvious 
disconnect between state provisions and scientific literature, however, is 
coupled with a lack of workable standards for predicting and evaluating 
competency. This has slowed development of research surrounding 
Jackson’s durational questions. Thus, resolving these durational questions 
requires further research and increased guidance in workable 
methodologies to predict and evaluate competency.  
A cross-disciplinary working group of mental health and legal experts 
would be well suited to tackle this problem by proposing best practices for 
mental health professionals to follow when predicting and evaluating 
competency. This, in turn, would help answer Jackson’s lingering 
durational questions, culminating in a model statute incorporating these 
solutions. Only with this concerted push to halt the divergence of science 
and law within the doctrine of competency can due process triumph and 
Jackson achieve its objectives. 
Nicholas Rosinia  
 
 
  J.D. Candidate (2012), Washington University in St. Louis School of Law; B.S. (2008), 
University of Florida. I would like to thank Professor Mae Quinn, whose criminal law class and 
scholarship inspired this Note. I would also like to thank the staff of the Washington University Law 
Review for their tireless editing and exceptional comments. Last, but certainly not least, I would like to 
thank my editor, Kristina Finney, without whom none of this would be possible. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
